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HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO?
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LGBTQ RIGHTS
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN†

In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for a
majority holding that same-sex couples enjoy a constitutional
right to marry as part of substantive due process. Yet in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, his majority opinion held that the Free Exercise Clause invalidated government sanctioning of a baker who had refused to
bake a cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding reception. In both
cases, the Court reasoned that the government must maintain
neutrality when confronted with competing viewpoints. The
Masterpiece Cakeshop Court concluded the state Civil Rights
Commission had violated this requirement by impugning the
baker’s claim that his religious beliefs justified discrimination
against LGBTQ individuals. But the Court’s demand for government neutrality was wrongheaded. In such cases, religious
freedom and LGBTQ rights clash. Rather than attempting to enforce a specious government neutrality, the Court should attend
to the needs of democracy. Many theorists of pluralist democracy
emphasize its processes, such as voting, but democracy also requires certain substantive preconditions if it is to exist and function. One cannot even conceptualize pluralist democracy without
accounting for the political community: Who belongs and participates? To protect the operation of democracy, to preserve its substantive preconditions, at least one issue must be taken off the table. Namely, all individuals, regardless of sub-culture or societal
grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens in good
standing. This issue can no longer be open to democratic debate.
But discrimination against a marginalized group or its members,

† .Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct
Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Mark Tushnet and Sam
Kalen for their comments on earlier drafts.
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such as LGBTQ individuals, inevitably undermines the standing of that group and its members in the political community.
Therefore, discrimination against same-sex couples and LGBTQ
individuals, even if arising from religious beliefs, cannot be
deemed of constitutional value.

ustice Anthony Kennedy wanted to have his cake and eat it too.
His majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges held that same-sex
couples enjoy a constitutional right to marry as part of substantive due process.1 Yet in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, his majority opinion held that the Free Exercise
Clause invalidated government sanctioning of a baker, Jack Phillips, who had discriminated against a same-sex couple, Charlie
Craig and Dave Mullins.2 Phillips had refused to bake a cake for
the couple’s wedding reception because he opposed same-sex
marriage on religious grounds.3 To be sure, Masterpiece Cakeshop
did not hold that all generally applicable laws prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQ individuals necessarily violate the First
Amendment.4 Rather, the Court reasoned that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission (“Commission”) had not treated Phillips’ religious beliefs with “neutral and respectful consideration” when adjudicating the discrimination claim against him.5

J

1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724
(2018). The sanctioning took the following form:
The Commission ordered Phillips to “cease and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding
cakes or any product [they] would sell to heterosexual couples.” Id. It
also ordered additional remedial measures, including “comprehensive
staff training on the Public Accommodations section” of CADA “and
changes to any and all company policies to comply with . . . this Order.” Id., at 58a. The Commission additionally required Phillips to
prepare “quarterly compliance reports” for a period of two years documenting “the number of patrons denied service” and why, along
with “a statement describing the remedial actions taken.”
Id. at 1726.
3. Robert E. Rains, Icing on the Wedding Cake: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Objections—Is There an Accommodation That Will Make Everyone Happy (or Unhappy)?, 42 VT. L.
REV. 191, 218 (2017).
4. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24, 1727.
5. Id. at 1729.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop entailed an indirect clash of constitutional values: religious freedom, based on the Free Exercise
Clause, and marital freedom, based on substantive due process.6
Because the constitutional rights of the same-sex couple were not
specifically at issue, free exercise and substantive due process did
not directly conflict.7 In fact, when Phillips refused to bake a cake
for Craig and Mullins, the Court had not yet decided Obergefell,8
and Colorado did not yet allow same-sex marriage.9 Even so, the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”) expressly prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation.10 Phillips nonetheless
claimed that the Commission violated his religious freedom when
it ordered him to “cease and desist from discriminating
against . . . same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding
cakes . . . .”11 As one commissioner emphasized, religious beliefs
could not justify statutorily-prohibited discrimination.12
The Court sided with Phillips and overruled the Commission’s decision because, according to Kennedy’s opinion, the
Commission had contravened religious neutrality.13 Kennedy
acknowledged that the case potentially implicated “the rights and
dignity of gay persons,”14 yet he insisted the Court could decide
the free exercise issue in favor of Phillips without undermining
LGBTQ rights.15 Kennedy and the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court were
mistaken. If same-sex marriage is constitutionally protected, as it is
after Obergefell, then discrimination against same-sex couples cannot also be constitutionally protected, even if the discrimination
arises from “sincere religious beliefs.”16 Kennedy, and the Court,
could not have their cake and eat it too. When the commissioner
explained that religion cannot legitimate unconstitutional dis-

6. Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop, 74 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 86, 93–94 (2017).
7. Id. at 88.
8. See id. at 87.
9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
11. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726.
12. Id. at 1729.
13. Id. at 1723–24.
14. Id. at 1723; see id. at 1727 (expressing concern for dignity and stigmatization of
LGBTQ individuals).
15. See id. at 1728–29 (emphasizing the narrowness of the free exercise issue).
16. Id. at 1729.
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crimination against same-sex couples,17 the commissioner acted
exactly as required by Obergefell and the Constitution.18 Kennedy
and the Court diminished the constitutional right to marry by validating Phillips’ free exercise claim and constitutionally protecting
his discrimination against Craig and Mullins.19
Democracy provides the crucial link illuminating the relationship between religious freedom and LGBTQ rights.20 Theorists
of pluralist democracy often emphasize its processes, such as voting,21 but democracy also requires certain substantive preconditions if it is to exist and function.22 One cannot even conceptualize
pluralist democracy without accounting for the political community:23 who belongs and participates? To protect the operation of
pluralist democracy and to preserve the substantive conditions
needed for democracy, at least one issue must be taken off the table.24 Namely, all individuals, regardless of sub-culture or societal
grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens in good standing.25 This issue can no longer be open to democratic debate. But
discrimination against a marginalized group or its members, such
as LGBTQ individuals, inevitably undermines the standing of that
group and its members in the political community.26 Therefore,
discrimination against same-sex couples and LGBTQ individuals,

17. Id. at 1721.
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
19. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 628–29 (2015) (arguing that businesses
should be allowed to discriminate if they publicly identify themselves as discriminatory).
20. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
21. See, e.g., Stephen Bloch, Cumulative Voting and the Religious Right: In the Best Interest of Democracy, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 1 (1998) (discussing the effects of implementing a cumulative voting system on a pluralistic democracy).
22. Robert Dahl developed the most comprehensive explanation of the democratic
process and its underpinnings. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS
(1989) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? (2001) [hereinafter HOW DEMOCRATIC]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter PREFACE]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY].
23. See Bloch, supra note 21.
24. Id. at 31–32.
25. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .”).
26. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community . . . .”).
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even if arising from religious beliefs, cannot be deemed of constitutional value.27
Part I explains Phillips’ free exercise claim. Part II focuses
on the relation between neutrality and democracy. It begins by
questioning whether the government can neutrally adjudicate the
tension between free exercise rights and substantive due process
rights to marry. It then articulates the substantive conditions that
are necessary for the operation of pluralist democracy. It ends by
emphasizing the relationship between religious freedom and democracy. Part III is the conclusion.
I. FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE AND GOVERNMENT NEUTRALITY
The most common free exercise case arises from an exemption claim.28 Typically, an individual seeks a court-ordered exception (or exemption) from a law of general applicability that allegedly burdens the individual’s exercise of religion.29 The
generally applicable law might be a criminal law, an employment
law, or any other widely applicable law.30 The Court articulated the
prevailing doctrine for exemption claims in the landmark 1990
decision, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.31 Smith rejected the use of a strict scrutiny test that the Court
used, at least nominally, for over twenty-five years.32 Under this ostensibly rigorous judicial standard, if the government failed to

27. To clarify, I do not argue per se that LGBTQ individuals have a constitutional
right to be protected from private discriminatory conduct. Rather, I argue that the Court
should not interpret the Free Exercise Clause to protect private conduct that discriminates against LGBTQ individuals or the LGBTQ community. It is worth emphasizing,
though, that the Court has already extended constitutional protections to LGBTQ individuals under substantive due process and to the LGBTQ community under equal protection. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015); United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
28. Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and The First Amendment: The History, the
Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 251 (2003).
29. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (denying an Orthodox
Jewish Air Force officer a free exercise exemption from Air Force regulations prohibiting
his wearing a skull-cap); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (granting an Old
Order Amish claimant a free exercise exemption from a state compulsory-education law).
30. E.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830–32 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian who refused to work on
Sundays but did not belong to an established church or sect).
31. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
32. Id. at 888; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (articulating a strict
scrutiny test).
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prove its action was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, then the government needed to grant the
claimant an exemption from its generally applicable law.33 After
Smith, the government would only need to satisfy a rational basis
test.34 If the government could prove that its action was rationally
related to a legitimate government interest, then the government
did not need to grant an exemption.35 Following this deferential
approach, the Smith Court refused to grant an exemption to an
individual who consumed peyote in supervised religious rituals
contravening state criminal law.36
The Smith Court, however, specified three exceptions from
its doctrinal rule.37 While rational basis review would normally be
appropriate, strict scrutiny would be required in the following circumstances: first, if the government purposefully discriminated
against religion;38 second, if the case involved the denial of unemployment compensation;39 and third, if the case involved a “hybrid” claim, where free exercise was combined with some other
constitutional right (often, free expression).40 In a subsequent
case the Court, in effect, added a fourth exception: religious organizations are exempt from generally applicable antidiscrimination employment laws when hiring or firing religious
ministers.41
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the first Smith exception came to
the forefront.42 The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court refused to apply
the deferential rational basis test because it found that the Commission had purposefully discriminated against Phillips because of
33. From an empirical standpoint, the government satisfied (or avoided) the strict
scrutiny test surprisingly often in free exercise cases. Stephen M. Feldman, Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision Making, 15 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 43, 50 (2006).
34. The Court reasoned that the “political process” should effectively determine the
scope of free-exercise rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41
(1990) (discussing Smith exceptions).
38. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78.
39. Id. at 883.
40. Id. at 881–82.
41. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194
(2012).
42. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018) (focusing on the free exercise claim, rather than the plaintiff’s free expression
claim under the First Amendment).
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his religion.43 For that reason, Kennedy’s majority opinion repeatedly referred to Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,44 the most prominent prior application of this exception.45
The Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye emphasized “the
principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to
disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.”46 The
city of Hialeah had enacted ordinances that prohibited religious
sacrifices of animals but did not otherwise restrict animal slaughter, such as for food.47 In doing so, the city had not maintained religious neutrality, according to the Court.48 To the contrary, the
city aimed to interfere with the practices of the Santeria religion,49
that combined elements of the traditional African Yoruba religion
with Catholicism and included animal sacrifices.50
The Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop concluded that the
Commission had violated the requirement of government neutrality, as the city of Hialeah had done in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye.51 Instead, “religious hostility”52 and “animosity”53 skewed the
Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.54 The Masterpiece
Cakeshop Court primarily supported this conclusion with two factors: first, a commissioner’s statement about religion and discrimination;55 and second, a comparison between the Commission’s
decision in Phillips’ case and three decisions involving another individual, William Jack.56

43. Id.
44. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542
(1993).
45. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31; see also id. at 1734, 1737 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 532.
47. Id. at 527.
48. Id. at 531.
49. Id. at 526–27.
50. Id. at 524.
51. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018).
52. Id. at 1724.
53. Id. at 1731.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1732.
56. Id. at 1749–50.
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The commissioner’s statement about religion and discrimination arose during a Commission meeting.57 The Court quoted
the commissioner at length:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the
hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion
and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I
mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where
freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use
their religion to hurt others.58
According to the Court, “these statements cast doubt on
the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of
Phillips’ case.”59 The Court found that the commissioner’s use of
the words despicable and rhetoric—“it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to
hurt others”—to be especially troubling.60 Despicable, the Court
reasoned, denoted the government’s disparagement of Phillips’
religion,61 while rhetoric suggested that Phillips’ religion was
“something insubstantial and even insincere.”62 The Court emphasized that “[t]he commissioner even went so far as to compare
Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.”63 Therefore, the commissioner’s statement about religion and discrimination undermined
the state’s argument that the Commission had been fair, impartial,
and neutral.64
The Court reinforced its conclusion by comparing Phillips’
case with those of William Jack.65 On three occasions, Jack asked

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1729.
Id.
Id. at 1730.
Id. at 1729.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1729–30.
Id. at 1730.
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bakers to create cakes decorated with images and Biblical invocations disparaging same-sex marriage.66 When the bakers refused
Jack’s requests, he filed complaints of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division (“Division”).67 The Division concluded
that none of the bakers had illegally discriminated against Jack,68
and the Commission affirmed the Division’s conclusions.69 According to the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court, the state could not adequately differentiate its treatment of Phillips’ case with that of Jack’s
cases.70 The Division had found that the bakers in Jack’s cases had
denied service because they believed his requested messages were
offensive in various ways, being “derogatory,” “hateful,” and “discriminatory.”71 The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court reasoned that the
Division’s and Commission’s acceptance of these justifications for
denial of service underscored the Commission’s hostility toward
Phillips’ religious justification for denying service.72 From the
Court’s perspective, the cases were indistinguishable.73
The Court crucially premised its decision on the possibility
of government neutrality.74 “While the issues here are difficult to
resolve,”75 Kennedy wrote, “it must be concluded that the State’s
interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious
objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality
that must be strictly observed.”76 The government, the Court emphasized, cannot evaluate the legitimacy of religious claims.77 Rather, the government must remain impartial in its treatment of diverse religious beliefs.78 Religious claims of conscience, in other
words, are not subject to government approval and disapproval.79
In fact, the Court went even further in emphasizing the possibility

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1730–31.
Id. at 1731.
Id. at 1732.
Id.
Id. at 1731.
Id.
Id. at 1732.
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for government neutrality.80 According to Kennedy’s opinion, the
government can and must avoid taking sides when resolving future
disputes apparently pitting religious freedom based on the First
Amendment against marital freedom based on substantive due
process.81 The government should not choose between religious
and marital freedom: “[T]hese disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and
without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods
and services in an open market.”82
Significantly, Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell emphasized the same point.83 The Obergefell Court reasoned that a
constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples can exist without diminishing the views or voices of religious opponents to
same-sex marriage.84 Thus, according to Kennedy, the Court itself
maintained neutrality even as it recognized the right to marry.85
“Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion,”86 Kennedy wrote, “based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs
are disparaged here.”87 Not only the government, but also the
Court (which, of course, is part of the government), can and must
remain neutral.88 Therefore, although Obergefell guaranteed samesex couples “marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples
of the opposite sex,”89 Kennedy added that “those who adhere to
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not
be condoned.”90

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Compare id., with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2597.
Id. at 2607.
Id.
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II. NEUTRALITY AND DEMOCRACY
A. Is Neutrality Possible?
The problem for Kennedy and the Court is that neutrality
is not only misguided, but also impossible.91 The reality is that
some (not all) religiously observant individuals sincerely believe
that homosexuality and same-sex marriage are immoral and contravene their religious tenets.92 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Phillips’ religious claims were most likely genuine.93 As “a devout Christian,”
he opposed same-sex marriage because it violated his deeply held
religious convictions.94 He believed “God’s intention for marriage
from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union
of one man and one woman.”95
Yet, simultaneously, discriminatory acts such as Phillips’ refusal to bake a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins have consequences.96 Discrimination harms the targeted individuals and
groups.97 In Obergefell, Kennedy unequivocally described how prohibitions of same-sex marriage injured LGBTQ individuals.98 He
characterized marriage as “a central institution of the Nation’s society.”99 When the government discriminated by allowing heterosexual but not same-sex marriage, the government stigmatizes and
“demeans gays and lesbians.”100 Legislative prohibitions of marriage for gays and lesbians “disparage their choices and diminish
their personhood.”101 Discrimination sends a message to LGBTQ
individuals as well as to society at large: “[E]xclusion from [mar-

91. Stephen M. Feldman, (Same) Sex, Lies, and Democracy: Tradition, Religion, and Substantive Due Process (With an Emphasis on Obergefell v. Hodges), 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 341, 344 (2015).
92. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602, 2607.
93. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018) (stating that “[t]he reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based on his
sincere religious beliefs and convictions”).
94. Id. at 1724.
95. Id.
96. See Andrew Jensen, Compelled Speech, Expressive Conduct, and Wedding Cakes: A
Commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 13 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 147, 155–56 (2018).
97. Id. at 156.
98. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601–02 (2015).
99. Id. at 2602.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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riage] has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal
in important respects.”102
The tension between LGBTQ individuals and their religiously motivated opponents cannot be avoided.103 Quite simply,
the views and values of LGBTQ individuals cannot be harmonized
with those who view homosexuality, same-sex marriage, and other
non-traditional sexual identities and behaviors to be heretical and
sacrilegious.104 Therefore, the government (and the Court) must
choose between the two sides.105 Neutrality is not an option. The
dissenters in Obergefell emphasized this point.106 Government
recognition of same-sex marriage, Justice Samuel Alito feared,
would marginalize and demean the views and values of traditionalists and the religiously faithful.107 If the Court recognized same-sex
marriage, as it did in Obergefell, then the Court necessarily diminished the views and values of those who opposed it.108 Alito wrote:
“[T]hose who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their
thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those
views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as
such by governments, employers, and schools.”109 Chief Justice
John Roberts condemned the Obergefell majority for being “compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate.”110 Justice
Clarence Thomas argued that the Obergefell decision threatened
“the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect.”111
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
joined by Alito, argued similarly.112 Gorsuch brushed aside the
suggestion that the state government, through its Commission,
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 2594–95 (majority opinion).
105. See id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2642–43.
108. Id.
109. Id. Unsurprisingly, Alito wrote the majority opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that regulations requiring closely held corporations to provide health insurance for contraceptive methods inconsistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
110. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (further accusing Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion of assaulting “the character of fairminded people” who believe
marriage must be only between a man and a woman).
111. Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1737
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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had acted neutrally.113 From Gorsuch’s perspective, the Commission’s different decisions in the Phillips and Jack cases underscored the lack of neutrality.114 The fact that the Commission allowed the bakers in Jack’s cases to deny service while sanctioning
Phillips for his denial of service revealed government hostility to
religion.115 “Nothing in the Commission’s opinions suggests any
neutral principle to reconcile these holdings.”116 Gorsuch insisted
that the government cannot be allowed to choose who to favor or
“to gerrymander their inquiries based on the parties they prefer.”117 Gorsuch not only repudiated government claims to neutrality, but also emphasized that the government must choose religion.118 In other words, as between religious and marital freedom,
the government must choose religious freedom. “[I]t is our
job,”119 Gorsuch wrote, to “afford legal protection to any sincere
act of faith.”120
B. The Substance of Democracy
While Gorsuch correctly reasoned that the government
must choose,121 he recommended the wrong choice. The government (and the Court) should choose the substantive due process
rights of LGBTQ individuals over First Amendment free exercise
rights. The crux of the matter is democracy.122 Since the 1930s, the
United States has operated as a pluralist democracy.123 According

113. Id. at 1736.
114. Id. at 1738–39.
115. Id. at 1736.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1739.
118. Id. at 1739–40.
119. Id. at 1738.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1739–40.
122. See Glen Staszewski, Obergefell and Democracy, 97 B.U. L. REV. 31, 34 (2017) (rebutting the view that Obergefell was an undemocratic decision).
123. From the framing through roughly the 1920s, the nation operated as a republican democracy. For discussions of the transition from republican democracy to pluralist
democracy, see, e.g., LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN
CHICAGO, 1919-1939, 252 (1990); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 3–5 (2008); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 151
(1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 117–18 (1996). Bruce Ackerman also emphasizes regime change in constitutional law; on the decade of the 1930s, see 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL
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to numerous constitutional and political theorists, process defines
pluralist democracy.124 In other words, a democratic government is
one that follows certain processes (or procedures) rather than
pursuing some specific substantive goal, such as the common good
or general welfare.125 For instance, each individual must be allocated a vote of identical weight with all other voters, and the option receiving the greatest number of votes wins.126 Most important, citizens and interest groups must be able to participate
fully and effectively by expressing their respective values and interests in the democratic arena.127 The government cannot dictate
any particular goals or visions of a good and proper life.128 Rather,
the government remains neutral, providing a framework of processes (and rights) that allows individuals and interest groups to
assert a plurality of visions.129
Although theorists have emphasized the centrality of process to pluralist democracy, some have also argued persuasively
that process alone cannot define democracy.130 Following the
proper processes is crucial, but pluralist democracy cannot be
maintained without the sustenance of certain substantive norms or
conditions.131 A democratic community, for instance, must maintain its democratic culture.132 If citizens are not widely committed
to the rules of the democratic game—negotiation, compromise,
and coalition-building—then the political community will splinter
into sharply polarized interest groups.133 Moreover, a citizen’s
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 4–5 (2014); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
256–57 (1998).
124. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS:
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 7–11 (1949); PREFACE, supra note 22, at 131; JOHN DEWEY,
FREEDOM AND CULTURE 176 (1939).
125. See, e.g., BINKLEY & MOOS, supra note 124, at 8–10; PREFACE, supra note 22, at
131.
126. ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 59–60; PREFACE, supra note 22, at 67.
127. DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 109, 169–75 (discussing free speech and other
rights integral to the democratic process).
128. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi–xvii, xxvii, 10, 29–35 (Expanded ed.,
2005) (articulating the philosophy of political liberalism).
129. SANDEL, supra note 123, at 4 (explaining procedural republic).
130. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS.
CONTROL 7 (1982).
131. See STEVEN LEVITISKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 97–100, 231
(2018) (emphasizing the importance of preserving democratic norms).
132. See ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 48–49.
133. See PREFACE, supra note 22, at 4, 143; DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 172; see also
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1, 162 (1953) (emphasizing a
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right to participate fully and effectively is not merely formal.134 Rather, citizens must have sufficient resources to participate.135 Individuals who lack the fundamentals of housing, education, or medical care cannot fully engage in political discussion and
participation regardless of their desire to play by the rules of the
game.136
To be clear, these substantive conditions or prerequisites
limit the reach of pluralist democratic processes.137 For example, a
legislature cannot constitutionally enact a law that would abridge
some citizens’ abilities and opportunities to participate—think of a
law denying or diluting the right to vote—even if a supermajority
of citizens and legislators followed the proper processes in enacting the law.138 Certain government actions must be off the table,
beyond democratic debate, because they would contravene the
substantive conditions necessary for robust pluralist democracy.139
Most important, all individuals, regardless of sub-culture or societal grouping, must be treated as full and equal citizens in good
standing.140 Even if a supermajority of Americans were to support a
law discriminating against LGBTQ individuals, such government
action must be unconstitutional because it would relegate the individuals to second-class democratic citizenship.141

“genuine community of our values”); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 129, 138, 512–13 (2d ed., 1971) (emphasizing
the rules of the game for democracy).
134. See DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 175.
135. See HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 22, at 150–52.
136. See id. at 132–33 (maintaining that liberty and equality are not in opposition); see
also ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 46 (emphasizing relative economic wellbeing).
137. See DEMOCRACY, supra note 22, at 176.
138. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (invalidating law
changing city boundaries to eliminate most African American voters).
139. Stephen F. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 265–66 (2015).
140. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 61 (2012) (discussing relation
between hate speech and being a citizen in good standing).
141. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (invalidating law
prohibiting same-sex marriages); Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV.
127, 147–63 (2017) (arguing for the need to recognize the identity of societal groups in
equal protection); Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 1579, 1579–83 (2017) (arguing that laws discriminating against LGBTQ individuals
should be subject to heightened scrutiny in equal protection challenges).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403639

FELDMAN_TOPUBLISHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

50

12/13/2018 12:37 PM

WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [Vol. 9:1

Whenever we discuss the processes of pluralist democracy,
we necessarily raise a preliminary substantive issue.142 We cannot
articulate citizens’ rights to participate fully and effectively in democracy without first considering the boundaries of the political
community: Who belongs?143 Without knowing who belongs to the
political community, we cannot reasonably discuss full and equal
participation.144 But in a robust pluralist democracy, full and equal
citizenship for all individuals must be a premise of the system.145
Without full and equal citizenship, allowing for equal political participation for all, then pluralist democracy does not truly exist.146
As Robert Dahl, the preeminent theorist of pluralist democracy,
has written: “The demos must include all adult members except
transients and persons proven to be mentally defective.”147
Discriminatory actions targeting LGBTQ individuals, such
as Phillips’ refusal to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage,
warp the boundaries of the political community.148 Any individual
who is a full and equal citizen in good standing should be “entitled to the same liberties, protections, and powers” that all other
citizens enjoy.149 Each individual, regardless of whether he or she
142. See HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 22, at 132.
143. Id. (arguing that the existence of democratic rights raises the question of rights
for whom); see also ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY 491 (1997) (emphasizing that it is “morally imperative” to recognize the
functions of political communities).
144. Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting the Reality of Our Inequality, 66 MERCER L. REV. 577, 642 (2015).
145. Id. at 612.
146. See HOW DEMOCRATIC, supra note 22 at 135–37 (emphasizing political equality as
an anchor for democracy); Emanuela Lombardo & Petra Meier, Good Symbolic Representation: The Relevance of Inclusion, 51 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 327, 327 (2018) (emphasizing that
inclusion can be normative or substantive); Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights:
Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 1006 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of having legislatures uphold a right in belonging to the political community).
147. ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, supra note 22 at 59–60 (emphasis added); see also Karen
Celis & Sarah Childs, Good Representatives and Good Representation, 51 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
314, 314 (2018) (discussing how to measure political equality in the form of good democratic representation); Eline Severs & Suzanne Dovi, The Good Representative 2.0: Why We
Need To Return To the Ethics of Political Representation, 51 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 309 (2018)
(identifying the criteria for actors to be considered democratically representative).
148. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2519–20 (2015) (emphasizing that allowing religious believers to discriminate can inflict harm on others); Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay
Curriculum Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2017) (discussing the harms inflicted on
LGBTQ individuals by anti-gay curriculum laws).
149. WALDRON, supra note 140, at 219–20.
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is LGBTQ, should be able “to walk down the street without fear of
insult or humiliation, to find the shops and exchanges open to
him, and to proceed with an implicit assurance of being able to interact with others without being treated as a pariah.”150 If discrimination against LGBTQ individuals is allowed, if they can be treated as less than full and equal citizens, then democracy is
necessarily stunted.151
Discriminatory conduct might not contravene democracy
as overtly as does a denial of suffrage, yet such conduct still undermines the substantive conditions for democracy and should
not be constitutionally protected.152 Discrimination treats individuals differently (or unequally) from other citizens exactly because
they belong to the designated group—gays and lesbians, in Phillips’ case.153 Discrimination sends the message that LGBTQ individuals should not get too comfortable because other Americans
would gladly mistreat them or cast them out altogether.154 In such
a social and political environment, LGBTQ individuals cannot
possibly participate in democratic negotiations, coalitions, and
compromises on an equal basis with other citizens.155 The political
strength of LGBTQ individuals is diminished before the democratic process even gets underway.156 Discrimination mutes the voices
of LGBTQ individuals, thus allowing other citizens to readily discredit or ignore their values and interests.157
C. Religious Freedom and Democracy
What about the rights of sincere religious believers such as
Phillips? Religionists are also entitled to full and equal citizen-

150. Id. at 220.
151. Nancy Fraser, Recognition Without Ethics?, 18 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 21, 27–29
(2001) (emphasizing “participatory parity”).
152. Feldman, supra note 91, at 354.
153. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1725
(2018).
154. See, e.g., Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1119,
1151 (2017) (emphasizing that social groupings—like transgender individuals—are sometimes important to recognize).
155. See, e.g., id. at 1179 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
156. See id. at 1134.
157. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–
80 (1980) (discussing how courts can facilitate the representation of minorities).
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ship.158 Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment explicitly protects religious freedom.159 Phillips, after all,
claimed that he refused to bake a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins precisely because same-sex marriage contravened his religious
convictions.160 Nevertheless, all full and equal citizens, including
religionists like Phillips, must have diminished rights and democratic power if and when they advocate for the discriminatory or
unequal treatment of a marginalized societal group or its members, such as LGBTQ individuals, based on that group’s ascriptive
qualities or differences from the mainstream.161 Recall that the
Masterpiece Cakeshop Court emphasized a commissioner’s statement
regarding the history of religion and discrimination: “Freedom of
religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history . . . . And to me it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their
religion to hurt others.”162 According to the Court, this statement
revealed hostility toward religion; the Commission did not act
neutrally.163
But the commissioner accurately depicted history.164 Some
religionists have persistently justified discrimination and persecution based on their religious convictions.165 The most obvious historical example involves Christian antisemitism and persecution of

158. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
160. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018).
161. It is worth emphasizing that, in many states, LGBTQ individuals were treated as
deviant sexual criminals through the twentieth century. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 189–90 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of anti-sodomy law as applied to homosexuals), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding anti-sodomy
laws unconstitutional); see also Jordan Blair Woods, LGBT Identity and Crime, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 667, 679–80 (2017).
162. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Tisa Wenger, Discrimination in the Name of Religion? Segregationists and
Slaveholders Did It, Too, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/05/discriminating-in-the-name-of-religion-segregat
ionists-and-slaveholders-did-it-too/?utm_term=.509062cd9c7b (explaining the use of
Christian ideology to discriminate against African Americans during pre-Civil War and
post-Civil War American history).
165. See id.
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Jews.166 The Christian Bible (or New Testament) explicitly blames
Jews for killing Jesus Christ and for stubbornly refusing to accept
him as the son of God.167 The Jews, from this perspective, therefore deserve to suffer and to be endlessly persecuted.168 Indeed,
the condemnation of Jews and Judaism became an integral “aspect
of Christian self-identity.”169 For centuries, New Testament discourse ostensibly justified antisemitism and persecution.170 Christian rulers forced Jews to wear badges or other signs of identification,171 isolated Jews in ghettos,172 and exiled Jews from entire
countries.173 Christians repeatedly accused, condemned, and punished Jews for supposedly sacrificing Christian children for religious purposes, as part of Jewish rituals.174 Nazi antisemitism, of
course, was rooted in traditional Christian tropes about Jews,
though the Nazis found new ways to subjugate and kill.175 “Even
when deportations and mass murder were already under way, decrees appeared in 1942 prohibiting German Jews from having
pets, getting their hair cut by Aryan barbers, or receiving the
Reich sport badge!”176
Nineteenth-century Americans frequently invoked Christianity and the Bible as justifying slavery.177 A few examples suffice

166. See WILLIAM NICHOLLS, CHRISTIAN ANTISEMITISM: A HISTORY OF HATE 311–15
(1993) (discussing Christian justifications for hating Jews, or antisemitism, in the nineteenth century).
167. John 19:12–16; Matthew 27:25; 1 Thessalonians 2:14–16; see also STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 10–27 (1997) (discussing the origins of Christian antisemitism); NICHOLLS, supra note 166, at 3, 84; ELAINE PAGELS, THE ORIGIN OF SATAN 10,
103 (1995).
168. Matthew 23:37–39; 1 Thessalonians 2:14–16.
169. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 38 (1989).
170. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 174 (1987).
171. See, e.g., id., at 204; JAMES R. MARCUS, THE JEW IN THE MEDIEVAL WORLD: A
SOURCE BOOK: 315-1791, at 138–39 (5th ed. 1974).
172. JOHNSON, supra note 170, at 235.
173. Id. at 213, 229–31.
174. LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA xxii–xxiii (1994).
175. JOHNSON, supra note 170, at 472–73; NICHOLLS, supra note 167, at xxii.
176. BAUMAN, supra note 169, at 17 (quoting Christopher R. Browning, The German
Bureaucracy and the Holocaust, in GENOCIDE: CRITICAL ISSUES OF THE HOLOCAUST 145, 147
(1983)).
177. DREW GILPIN FAUST, A SOUTHERN STEWARDSHIP: THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE
PROSLAVERY ARGUMENT (1979), reprinted in PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, IDEOLOGY, AND
POLITICS 129, 137–39 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989) (emphasizing pro-slavery reliance on
Bible and Christianity). To be clear, abolitionists as well as proslavery advocates invoked
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to make the point. In the introduction to Cotton is King, an anthology published in 1860, E.N. Elliott wrote: “We understand the
nature of the negro race; and in the relation in which the providence of God has placed them to us, they are happy and useful
members of society.”178 In one of the Cotton is King essays, a Baptist
pastor, Thornton Stringfellow, explained:
Under the gospel, it has brought within the range
of gospel influence, millions of [slaves] among ourselves, who but for this institution, would have sunk
down to eternal ruin; knowing not God, and
strangers to the gospel. In their bondage here on
earth, they have been much better provided for,
and great multitudes of them have been made the
freemen of the Lord Jesus Christ, and left this world
rejoicing in hope of the glory of God.179
In another essay in the same volume, Albert Tayler
Bledsoe, an American Episcopal minister and a professor at the
University of Virginia, maintained that “the institution of slavery,
as it exists among us at the South, is founded in political justice, is
in accordance with the will of God and the designs of his providence, and is conducive to the highest, purest, best interests of
mankind.”180 Meanwhile, James Henry Hammond, who served in
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and as governor of
South Carolina, wrote that “American slavery is not only not a sin,

religion. See Ferenc M. Szasz, Antebellum Appeals to the “Higher Law,” 1830-1860, 110 ESSEX
INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 33, 37–47 (1974).
178. E.N. ELLIOTT, COTTON IS KING AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENTS ix (1860).
179. Thornton Stringfellow, The Bible Argument: Or, Slavery in the Light of Divine Revelation, in COTTON IS KING AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENTS 461, 491 (E.N. Elliott ed., 1860); see
THORNTON STRINGFELLOW, A SCRIPTURAL VIEW OF SLAVERY (1856), reprinted in SLAVERY
DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH 86, 86–88 (Eric L. McKitrick ed., 1963) (drawing on Bible to advocate for slavery). Elliott praised Stringfellow’s Cotton is King essay:
“The plain and obvious teachings, of both Old and New Testament, are given with such
irresistible force as to carry conviction to every mind . . . .” ELLIOTT, supra note 178, at xiii.
180. Albert Taylor Bledsoe, Liberty and Slavery: Or, Slavery in the Light of Moral and Political Philosophy, in COTTON IS KING AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENTS 271, 273 (E.N. Elliott ed.,
1860).
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but especially commanded by God through Moses, and approved
by Christ through his apostles.”181
Through the twentieth century, segregationists continued
to use religion to justify their racist policies and laws.182 For example, the Baptist Reverend James F. Burks argued in favor of segregation in 1954: “The Word of God is the surest and only infallible
source of our facts of Ethnology, and when man sets aside the
plain teachings of this Blessed Book and disregards the boundary
lines God Himself has drawn, man assumes a prerogative that belongs to God alone.”183 Mississippi Senator Theodore G. Bilbo
maintained that “miscegenation and amalgamation are sins of
man in direct defiance with the will of God.”184 In a case that ended in the Supreme Court, Loving v. Virginia, the trial judge explained why anti-miscegenation laws were ostensibly necessary:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate
continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.185
Unfortunately, history is filled with religiously-inspired
claims to justify discrimination and persecution of marginalized
groups and their members.186 Moreover, such discrimination and
persecution, as exemplified by anti-miscegenation and other Jim
Crow laws, were often adopted through seemingly democratic
channels.187 But if we properly understand the substantive conditions of pluralist democracy, then religion can never justify dis-

181. James Henry Hammond, Hammond’s Letters on Slavery, in THE PRO-SLAVERY
ARGUMENT: AS MAINTAINED BY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED WRITERS OF THE SOUTHERN
STATES 99, 108 (1852).
182. Jane Dailey, Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, 91 J. AM. HIST. 119, 121
(2004).
183. Id. at 121 (quoting Reverend James F. Burks).
184. Id. at 125 (quoting Mississippi Senator Theodore G. Bilbo); see id. at 125–26
(providing additional examples of utilizing religion to justify segregation).
185. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
186. See Wenger, supra note 164.
187. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (demonstrating that Virginia was one of sixteen states to
legally adopt laws that prohibited interracial marriage).
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criminatory conduct or law.188 In a well-functioning democracy,
some issues must be off the table.189 Unquestionably, we should no
longer debate whether racial minorities are entitled to full and
equal participation in the democratic process.190 The same should
be true regarding LGBTQ individuals. Full and equal citizenship
for LGBTQ individuals should be among the “settled features of
the social environment to which we are visibly and pervasively
committed.”191 The fact that critics of LGBTQ individuals and
same-sex marriage, such as Phillips, might be inspired or motivated by religion is irrelevant.192
Discrimination appears to legitimate further democratic
debate about the status of LGBTQ individuals while simultaneously diminishing their full and equal ability to participate in the
democratic process.193 Discrimination thrusts LGBTQ individuals
into a second-class position in our polity.194 Some individuals, in
such circumstances, will react by remaining silent or hiding their
differences from the mainstream.195 Others will attempt to continue participating openly in the democratic arena, yet their words
and ideas must overcome the disadvantages of a diminished communal status.196 “The issue is,” according to Jeremy Waldron, “the
harm done to individuals and groups through the disfiguring of
188. E.g., id. at 3, 7–12 (invalidating anti-miscegenation laws despite claim that religion required separation of races).
189. E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 118 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (advocating that the right against self-incrimination has always been foundational to liberty in
a functioning society).
190. KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE 255 (2012) (emphasizing a right to
full participation in society).
191. WALDRON, supra note 140, at 95; see also KWAMME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS
OF IDENTITY 193 (2005).
192. See WALDRON, supra note 140, at 130.
193. Id. at 96–97 (arguing that the constitutionality of hate speech should not be
evaluated pursuant to doctrinal tests, which would tend to legitimate debate over hate
speech).
194. “All We Want is Equality:” Religious Exemptions and Discrimination against LGBTQ
People in the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report
/2018/02/19/all-we-want-equality/religious-exemptions-and-discrimination-against-lgbtpeople.
195. See SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 43 (2017) (discussing the
potential for silencing outsiders on a campus); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY
/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 100–02 (1991) (arguing that members of targeted groups sometimes seek assimilation to avoid degradation).
196. Catriona Mackenzie, Three Dimensions of Autonomy: A Relational Analysis, in
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 15, 21–23 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds.,
2014) (arguing for importance of protecting opportunities in social environments).
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our social environment . . . to the effect that in the opinion of one
group in the community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of equal citizenship.”197 A fair and
open democratic dialogue or exchange of ideas is impossible if social power is skewed before the dialogue even begins.198 Pluralist
democracy fails when some in the political community treat others
as less than citizens of full and equal standing.199
In short, discrimination of marginalized groups or their
members within the political community is not worthy of constitutional value and should not be protected under the First Amendment, even if the discriminatory conduct arises from religious
conviction.200 To be sure, religion should not be broadly condemned.201 Even though religion has sometimes inspired atrocities, history is also filled with religiously-inspired acts of social justice.202 Think of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.203 But the
social and political consequences of religion in general are beside
the point here. The Free Exercise Clause protects Phillips’ right to
believe in his religion, but the question in Masterpiece Cakeshop was
whether Phillips’ invocation of religion insulated his discriminato197. WALDRON, supra note 140, at 33.
198. See Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation, in AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 227, 227 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014).
199. Discrimination is likely to inculcate members and non-members of a targeted
group with deformed attitudes toward the group; that is, disdain (including self-disdain)
for the targeted group seems legitimate. Id.
200. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, The Free Exercise of Religious Identity, 64 UCLA L. REV.
54, 59 (2017). It is worth noting that my argument bypasses any potential problems arising
from the state-action doctrine, which emphasizes that most constitutional limitations apply only against traditional state actors. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (applying state-action doctrine); Terri Peretti, Constructing
the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 273 (2010) (discussing evolution
of state-action doctrine); Mark Tushnet, Introduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and
the Information Economy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234, 2253–57 (2014) (emphasizing state-action
doctrine issues). I do not argue that Phillips’ conduct, in particular, or private discrimination, in general, violates the Constitution. Rather, I argue that such non-government conduct has no constitutional value. For that reason, the Court should not extend constitutional protections to such conduct. Moreover, I do not argue that the Court itself has
violated the Constitution by shielding Phillips’ discriminatory conduct, though Shelley v.
Kraemer suggests judicial action can sometimes amount to state action. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Instead, I present a normative argument: that the Court should not interpret the Free Exercise Clause to protect discriminatory conduct.
201. Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 511 (2017).
202. See id. at 517, 523 (arguing in favor of special treatment for religion); Martin Luther King, Jr., The Most Durable Power, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 10–11 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1991).
203. King, supra note 202.
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ry conduct from sanction.204 And on this crucial question, the
Commission was exactly right: Religion should not justify discrimination.205
In the language emphasized by the Masterpiece Cakeshop
Court, the commissioner asserted two points.206 The first was historical and factual: “Freedom of religion and religion has been
used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history.”207
This historical statement was unequivocally correct. As discussed,
history is littered with attempts to justify discrimination and persecution based on religious beliefs.208 The commissioner’s second
point was normative: “And to me it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to
hurt others.”209 But contrary to the Court’s conclusion, this normative statement did not reveal hostility toward religion when understood in the context of the dispute.210
Remember, Phillips had invoked his religion to justify discrimination against Craig and Mullins.211 Phillips would not bake a
wedding cake for their same-sex marriage.212 The Commission was
adjudicating whether Phillips had violated CADA, the state antidiscrimination statute, which prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation (among other things).213 The prohibited discrimination could not be allowed regardless of Phillips’ justification.214 Like others before him, Phillips might have alternatively
invoked freedom of contract, federalism-concerns for state sover-

204. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1726
(2018); see Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990) (distinguishing between religious beliefs and religiously-motivated conduct).
205. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726; see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele
Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit’s Bad Faith:
When Religious Belief Undermines Modern Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1113 (2016) (“We
argue people still can believe what they want, worship as they choose, and follow their religious precepts—until and unless doing so would hurt someone else.”); Lucas, supra note
200, at 59–60 (arguing to constitutionally protect claims of religious identity but not to
protect a right to discriminate).
206. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 1730.
211. Id. at 1724.
212. Id. at 1730.
213. COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
214. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
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eignty, a fear of government tyranny, or any ostensible reason to
insulate his conduct from government regulation.215 Phillips’ asserted justification did not matter because the Commission needed to focus on whether Phillips had engaged in prohibited discriminatory conduct.216 The commissioner’s normative statement
was therefore unnecessary because it did not address the fact of
the prohibited discriminatory conduct, but the statement was eminently reasonable.217 If anything, the commissioner appeared to
suggest that religion should have a higher calling.218 It can promote social justice, social harmony, personal redemption, and the
like.219 A person acts despicably, according to the commissioner,
when he or she twists religious tenets (as well as the constitutional
principle of free exercise) to justify discrimination or persecution.220
The Commission acted congruously in adjudicating William Jack’s claims.221 Recall that Jack, on three occasions, had
asked bakers to create cakes decorated with images and Biblical
invocations disparaging same-sex marriage.222 As Justice Elena Kagan emphasized in her concurrence, the Commission concluded
that the bakers had not discriminated against Jack based on any of
215. Peggy Cooper Davis et. al., The Persistence of the Confederate Narrative, 84 TENN. L.
REV. 301 (2017) (arguing that federalism-based emphases on state sovereignty undermine
the national protection of civil rights); Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of “Private
Choice” for Constitutional Analysis, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549 (2002) (emphasizing that the
Court’s protection of private choice undermines the constitutional commitment to equality); K. Sabeel Rahman, Reconstructing the Administrative State in An Era of Economic and Democratic Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1671 (2018) (arguing that attacks on democratic government that encourage privatization simultaneously undermine opportunities for
democratic control over certain social interactions); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (explaining how the Roberts Court uses a marketlibertarian approach reminiscent of freedom of contract to invalidate employment and
consumer protections); Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929 (2015) (discussing interrelationship between private property rights and rights to use public accommodations).
216. COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
217. Thus, for instance, Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin write: “People can
justify the most horrible of actions, including watching their children die from treatable
illnesses, in the noblest of [religious] rhetoric.” Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 205,
at 1135.
218. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (2018).
219. Alfred J. Sciarrino, Civil Rights: Religion in the Public Sphere, 30 HOW. L.J. 1127,
1132 (1987).
220. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
221. Id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 1728.
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the statutorily-prohibited grounds.223 A baker can refuse to bake a
cake because of a would-be customer’s requested message, but a
baker cannot refuse to bake a cake because of the would-be customer’s “disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry.”224 Unlike the bakers in the
Jack cases, Phillips had refused to bake a cake for Craig and Mullins because of their sexual orientation, a prohibited ground of
discrimination.225 As Kagan explained, “a vendor [such as Phillips]
cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion
disapproves selling a product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait.”226
Even if the commissioner (and the Commission) had expressed hostility toward religion, the context of this particular dispute, in which Phillips discriminated against Craig and Mullins, is
determinative.227 Contrary to Kennedy and the Court’s assertions,
in both Masterpiece Cakeshop and Obergefell, the government could
not be neutral.228 Discrimination against LGBTQ individuals necessarily undermines the requisite substantive conditions for pluralist democracy.229 Rather than aiming for a specious neutrality, the
223. Id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).
224. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017); see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at
1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the bakers did not discriminate against
Jack because of his religion).
225. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724; see id. at 1727 (stating that LGBT people
receive legal and constitutional protection because they “cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth”).
226. Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring). Gorsuch wrote: “[T]he Commission accepted the bakers’ view that the specific cakes Mr. Jack requested conveyed a message offensive to their convictions and allowed them to refuse service. Having done that there, it
must do the same here [in Phillips’ case].” Id. at 1738–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Gorsuch’s mistake is to focus too strongly on the motivations of the discriminator rather than
on the discriminating conduct and its target.
227. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 268 (2009)
(arguing that a politics of “mutual respect” will sometimes require challenging “the moral
and religious convictions that our fellow citizens bring to public life”).
228. The government could not be neutral because there are two sides to this issue—
religious individuals like Phillips, and individuals seeking equality on the basis of sexual
orientation, like Craig and Mullins. The only two sides to the issue are the two options the
government must choose from when ruling, preventing neutrality. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1739 (noting that religion can and did affect the government’s ability to apply the same level of generality across cases); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2642–43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority was not neutral
“[b]y imposing its own views [on same-sex marriage] on the entire country”).
229. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review
to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1065 (2004) (defining tolerance as vetoing state discretion to treat LGBT people as “outlaws or degenerates,” and
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government should affirmatively nurture democratic culture by
ensuring that all citizens can fully and equally participate in the
polity.230 If the government allows an individual or business to discriminate against a marginalized (and statutorily-protected) group
or its members, the government is not acting neutrally.231 Instead,
the government is facilitating the continued marginalization of
the targeted group within the political community.232 The ability
of that group and its members to speak and otherwise participate
within the community will inevitably be diminished.233 Ultimately,
a pluralist democratic government cannot merely provide an abstract framework of procedures that allows individuals to assert
their respective interests and values.234 Regardless of the content
or source of those individual interests and values—even if the content or source is religious—certain substantive questions and matters must be off the table if a pluralist democracy is to exist.235 All
individuals, including members of the LGBTQ community, must
be treated as full and equal citizens in good standing.236
III. CONCLUSION
The Court in Obergefell held that substantive due process
protected a right to marry for same-sex couples.237 Yet the Court in
Masterpiece Cakeshop extended constitutional protection to a baker

discussing how toleration towards homosexuality is necessary for the survival of a pluralist
democracy).
230. See SMITH, supra note 143, at 12 (arguing that egalitarians need “to give up conceiving of good governments as bloodless neutral umpires of private activities and preexisting rights”); see also Mark E. Warren, A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Theory, 111
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 39, 44 (2017) (arguing that democratic governments should empower
inclusion in democratic decision making).
231. See Benjamin, F. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, 40 TEX. L. REV.
599, 600–01 (1962).
232. See id. at 600.
233. BEN-PORATH, supra note 195 (using the context of campus free speech disputes,
free speech advocates who insist on “open-minded free inquiry” ignore the reality that
“when many on campus are effectively silenced, inquiry is in fact neither free nor openminded”).
234. Id. at 43–44.
235. Id.
236. In other words, religious freedom should not trump a right to full and equal
standing in the democratic polity. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RATIONAL
THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW 232–36 (2011) (arguing that various constitutional
rights should not be understood as one better than another).
237. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
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who claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from baking a
wedding cake for a same-sex wedding.238 The Court, in other
words, shielded purposeful discrimination against a same-sex couple.239 The Court cannot have it both ways. If same-sex marriage is
constitutionally protected, then discrimination against same-sex
couples cannot also be constitutionally protected, even if the discrimination arises from sincere religious beliefs.240 Discrimination
against LGBTQ individuals undermines the substantive conditions
that are prerequisite to pluralist democracy.241
When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission decided to
sanction the baker, Phillips, for discriminating against the samesex couple, Craig and Mullins—because Phillips had discriminated
based on sexual orientation—the Commission bolstered pluralist
democracy.242 When other bakers refused William Jack’s request to
bake cakes with anti-LGBTQ messages, they too bolstered democracy.243 They would not acquiesce to Jack’s desire to demean the
status of same-sex couples.244 The Commission therefore decided
the Jack cases correctly by finding against Jack and, in doing so, reinforced democracy.245 But when the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court
overturned the Commission’s decision in Phillips’ case, the Court
acted erroneously. Despite its pretensions toward neutrality, the
Court undermined the substantive conditions of democracy. In
the guise of upholding the First Amendment and the free exercise
of religion, the Court instead effectively cooperated with Phillips
in demeaning the full and equal standing of LGBTQ individuals in
the American polity.

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1739.
Id.
Id. at 1750–51 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1739.
Id. at 1730.
Id.
Id.
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